We consider a serial supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. Each obtains some demand forecast information, which may be shared or not. We investigate the members' benefits from sharing information. The forecasts follow a variant of the Martingale model of forecast evolution (MMFE). We construct a simple transfer-payment scheme to align the players' incentives with that of the overall system. The main finding is that, unless the players' incentives are aligned in this way, sharing information makes little sense. It might hurt one or the other player and the system as a whole.
Introduction
We consider a serial supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. Each obtains some demand forecast information, which may be shared or not. We investigate how much and in what ways the parties benefit from sharing this information. Is collaborative forecasting always beneficial for both? In a centralized system, consolidated information is always better. Here, the parties might have divergent objectives, so the role of information is less clear.
In particular, we explore the following questions: How much does it cost for the parties in a supply chain to compete, as opposed to cooperate fully? How does the asymmetry of demand forecast information magnify inefficiency and unfairness? In a competitive environment, who gains from collaborative forecasting-the retailer or the supplier, or both, or neither? How can we coordinate the decisions made by these independent organizations to maximize the total profit and share it in a reasonable way?
The system works as follows. Customer demands are stochastic and occur only at the retailer. The retailer is replenished by the supplier, and the supplier is replenished by an outside source with ample capacity. The transportation times from the outside source to the supplier are constant, and so are the times from the supplier to the retailer. Unsatisfied customer demands are backordered. There are inventory holding costs at the two stages and backorder penalty costs. The supplier and the retailer share actual demand and inventory information. Regarding future customer demands, they have some common information but also their own information, which they do not share. The demand forecasts follow a version of the Martingale model of forecast evolution (MMFE), described later.
We consider four modes of decision making. The first mode is the centralized case. The second mode is a teamlike cooperative case, where the two players share the common goal of minimizing the supply chain's total cost, but they have different information. This case could be interpreted as an organization with two managers, where each manager has his own sources of information that cannot easily be shared, but nevertheless both follow decision rules aimed to minimize the system-wide total cost. Thus, they act as a team. Chen (1999) models a multiechelon inventory model in this way. Similar situations can occur with independent organizations. These parties aim to improve the whole supply chain's performance, but they have their own sensitive information that they cannot share or prefer not to share. We show that a forecast-centered base-stock policy is optimal for all parties.
The third mode is the competitive case with centralized demand forecasts. Each player aims to minimize his own cost, and the players share their own demand forecasts. This scenario leads to a game. The two players simultaneously choose their forecast-centered base-stock levels. The supplier pays the inventory holding cost at stage 2 and part of the backorder-penalty cost. The retailer pays the inventory holding cost at stage 1 and the rest of the backorder-penalty cost. This framework follows Cachon and Zipkin (1999) , who consider a similar system with independent demands. They describe two games, depending on the inventory measures used, namely, an echelon inventory (EI) game and a local inventory (LI) game. Here, we focus on the EI game and extend their analysis to our more complex demand structure. We show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium. The optimal policy of the centralized case (i.e., the first mode) is not a Nash equilibrium. Thus, without any coordination, the players have incentives to deviate from the optimal policy.
Finally, the fourth mode is the competitive case with decentralized demand forecasts. Each player aims to minimize his own cost, as in the third mode, but they do not share their demand forecasts. Again, the optimal policy (for the second mode) is not a Nash equilibrium. Thus, without any coordination, the players again have incentives to deviate from the optimal policy.
Thus, competition leads to inefficiency. To remedy it, we consider transfer payments. We construct a linear transferpayment contract, such that when each player minimizes his own cost, the resulting Nash equilibrium for the third mode equals the solution of the first mode, and the equilibrium for the fourth mode equals the solution of the second mode. (However, there might be other equilibria as well. ) We show analytically that by sharing the retailer's own demand forecasts, the supplier's cost cannot get worse in the competitive situation, and the supply chain's total cost cannot get worse in the cooperative situation. Beyond this case, however, the effects of sharing information are more complex.
With some numerical studies we evaluate the difference in performance between competitive and cooperative policies and between centralized and decentralized forecasts. We find that the competition between the players complicates the effects of sharing demand forecasts on performance. For some problem instances, sharing information leads to worse solutions.
The technical contributions of the paper include the following. We characterize the optimal policy for a multiechelon inventory model with decentralized demand forecasts. Also, we characterize the Nash equilibria of the cooperative EI game.
Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the demand-forecast model. Section 4 develops the twostage inventory model. Section 5 explains the four modes of decision making. Section 6 characterizes optimal policies for the first and second modes. Section 7 analyses the echelon inventory game with demand forecasts, corresponding to the third and fourth modes of decision making. Section 8 constructs and analyzes the linear transfer-payment contract. Section 9 discusses some of the benefits of sharing information. Section 10 presents the numerical studies, and §11 concludes.
Literature Review
Several studies have dealt with coordination schemes in various models of supply chains. See Cachon (2003) for a comprehensive review. Some of these studies focus on inventory management. The paper by Cachon and Zipkin (1999) is closely related to ours. They study a competitive situation between a supplier and a retailer and propose a linear transfer-payment scheme, under which each player follows the system-optimal policy. Lee and Whang (1999) discuss coordination in a serial system and develop a nonlinear scheme, which again induces system-optimal behavior. Porteus (2000) proposes a token mechanism to facilitate decentralized control. Chen (1999) studies a serial system with information delays and shows the optimality of a local base-stock policy for the team scenario. He also develops a cost-accounting scheme that induces each player to follow the optimal policy. Watson and Zheng (2005) study a demand-focused decentralization scheme with a novel accounting method to measure performance. Bernstein and DeCroix (2006) and Zhang (2006) study decentralized assembly systems and analyze equilibrium base-stock levels. None of these studies considers demand forecast information.
Here, we develop a forecast-update model with two players, a variant of the MMFE model. Several works have explored the use of MMFE-like models within larger models for operational decisions. Building on earlier work by Hausman (1969) , Heath and Jackson (1994) introduce the MMFE. They also incorporated it into a simulation model, which contains a linear-programming model for production and distribution planning. Graves et al. (1986) independently develop a similar demand model and use it within a production-smoothing model. Graves et al. (1998) incorporate it into a system that mimics the logic of MRP. Güllü (1996) analyzes the value of forecast information in procurement decisions, using a special case of the MMFE. Toktay and Wein (2001) analyze a stationary capacitated inventory model with the MMFE, considering a particular class of policies called forecast-corrected base-stock policies. Gallego and Özer (2001) develop an inventory model with advance demand information. The MMFE can be interpreted as a case of their model. Iida and Zipkin (2006) study a forecast-inventory model with the MMFE and develop a technique to obtain approximately optimal policies. Lu et al. (2006) develop bounds on the optimal base-stock levels for a forecast-inventory model with the MMFE and also cost error bounds for heuristic policies. These works all assume centralized control, however. We are concerned here with decentralized forecasting and decision making.
Some studies have discussed the effects of sharing demand forecast information in a supply chain. Aviv (2001) develops a two-stage supply chain model with a supplier and a retailer with a kind of the MMFE model, where the forecast updates of each player are independent both within a period and over periods, but each may be correlated with its counterpart in the other player's updates. He discusses the effect of collaborative forecasting. Zhu and Thonemann (2004) develop a model with a retailer and multiple customers and analyze optimal information sharing and inventory policies. While the works above treat MMFE-like demands, other studies focus on sharing information within other types of demand models. Lee et al. (2000) study the value of sharing demand information in a two-stage supply chain where demands follow an AR(1) process. Commenting on this paper, Raghunathan (2001) argues that the supplier can use the retailer's order history to forecast demands, and then the benefits of sharing demand information disappear. Aviv (2002) develops a similar model, but customer demand evolves according to an auto-regressive time series with market signals, and both a retailer and a supplier have their own signals that are not shared. With this setting, he examines the value of information sharing, VMI and collaborative forecasting. Aviv (2007) studies the benefits of collaboration in a more complex model. See Chen (2003) for a review of these and related works. None of these studies considers competition.
There is of course a large literature on optimal policies under centralized control with independent demands. See, e.g., Zipkin (2000) for a summary. For more complex demand processes, Chen and Song (2001) show the optimality of a state-dependent echelon base-stock policy for the case of Markov-modulated demand. Dong and Lee (2003) and Gallego and Özer (2003) obtain similar results for the MMFE.
In sum, the literature on competition in supply chains treats only the simplest demand and information structures, while the literature on more complex demand models ignores competition. It seems plausible that the strategic behavior of the players should have a major impact on the value of shared information. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to consider such interactions.
The Forecast-Update Model
This section first briefly reviews the forecast-update model with one player and then develops a model with two players.
The Forecast-Update Model with One Player
We maintain forecasts of demands in future periods. In each period the forecasts are revised by observing the forecastupdate vector, which represents all new information about future demands. We update the forecasts only for a fixed number of future periods. We call this number the forecastupdate horizon and denote it M. Let e t s denote the forecast update in period t for the demand in period s. Fix e t s = 0 for s < t. Assume E e t s = 0. This means that the forecast updates embody new information available in period t but not before (see Heath and Jackson 1994, pp. 21-22) . Let e t denote the forecast-update vector in period t; i.e., e t = e t t e t t + 1 e t t + M . These vectors are independent and identically distributed over t. The updates within period t, however, need not be independent over s. Assume that the initial forecast of demand in all future periods is . Let F t s denote the forecast in period t for the demand in period s. Then,
The actual demand in period t is D t = F t t ; i.e.,
Note that the forecast-update horizon M is part of the description of the mechanics of the customer demands. The final demands are the results of M + 1 events that occur at different times.
The Forecast-Update Model with Two Players
We now develop a forecast-update model with two players. While the players share some information about demands in future periods, each player has his own information which is not shared. Each player maintains a forecast of demands in future periods which is decomposed into two parts: One is based on the common shared information about future demands, and the other is based on that player's own information. The common information might include the market share of the product, the economic growth rate, the retailer's past order history, and so on. In every period their forecasts are revised by observing forecast-update vectors for the common information and each player's own information. Again, these vectors represent new information.
Let M 0 denote the forecast-update horizon for the common information, and M i i = 1 2 the horizon for player i's own information. Let e 0 t s denote the forecast update in period t for the demand in period s due to the common information, and e i t s i = 1 2 the update due to player i's own information. Fix e 0 t s = 0 for s < t and e i t s = 0 for s t, i = 1 2. Assume E e i t s = 0 for i = 0 1 2 and for all t and s. Let e 0 t denote the forecastupdate vector in period t for the common information; i.e., e 0 t = e 0 t t e 0 t t + 1 e 0 t t + M 0 , and e i t i = 1 2 the vector for player i's own information. The forecast update vectors e i t are independent and identically distributed over t, and they are independent over i = 0 1 2. The common-information updates within a period need not be independent. On the other hand, the own-information updates e i t i = 1 2 are independent over s. (We make this assumption to avoid an inference problem. If a player's own updates are dependent within a period, the other player can infer something about the first one's own forecasts by observing actual demands. Thus, the correlation of demands over periods is represented only through the common-information forecast updates.) The initial forecast of demand in every future period is . Let F 0 t s denote the forecast in period t for the demand in period s due to the common shared information, and F i t s i = 1 2 the forecast due to the player i's own information. Then, 
The actual demand in period t is
t denote the sum of the forecasts at the beginning of period t of demands from period t + u to period t + v for i = 1 2 and u v; i.e.,
Two-Stage Inventory Model
Consider a one-product inventory system with a supplier and a retailer. The supplier is stage 2, and the retailer is stage 1. Customer demands occur at stage 1. Unsatisfied demands are backlogged. The supplier pays inventory holding costs at stage 2 and a part of the backlog penalty cost. The retailer pays inventory holding cost at stage 1 and the rest of the backlog penalty cost.
Specifically, the retailer pays p per period for each backorder, and the supplier pays 1 − p, 0 1. Thus, p is the total system backorder cost, and specifies how this cost is divided. This formulation follows Cachon and Zipkin (1999) . Both players incur inventory holding costs. The supplier's local inventory holding cost (per unit per period) is H 2 , and the retailer's is H 1 . The supplier's echelon inventory holding cost (per unit per period) is h 2 , and the retailer's is h 1 , where h 2 = H 2 > 0 and
Time periods are numbered 1 2 Demands are generated by the forecast-update model with two players described in the previous section. The update processes are exogenous. Both the supplier and the retailer have complete information about the past actual customer demands. There is a lead time for shipments from the source to the supplier, L 2 , and from the supplier to the retailer, L 1 .
The sequence of events during a period is as follows: At the beginning of a period, an order decision is made by the supplier, based on his current information, and a corresponding purchase cost is paid. Also, the decision is made how much to ship from the supplier to the retailer. During the period the forecasts are updated, shipments arrive at each stage, and customer demand occurs. At the end of the period, the holding and penalty costs are charged.
We define some state variables. 
Regarding the information available to the players when they make their decisions, we assume the following three points:
. The two players both know the underlying demand model and the underlying two-stage inventory model. They dynamically learn the common demand forecast, the realized customer demands, and the inventory information. Each dynamically observes his own demand forecast. They do not share this last information. 2. Each player makes decisions based on the common demand forecasts and his own demand forecasts. He does not use any other information. 3. The forecast-update horizon of the supplier's own demand forecasts is less than or equal to the lead time between the supplier and the retailer
The second assumption means that the supplier does not try to infer information from the retailer's orders, and the retailer does not try to infer information from the supplier's inventory level. This is reasonable, because the players do not deliberately and explicitly share information. Also, with this assumption we can separate the players' decisions from their forecasting models (that is, the way they forecast demands using the information they have). Thus, we can avoid specifying how the players forecast demands using the information they have, which allows us to focus on optimizing their replenishment decisions. Without this assumption, the retailer might try to play a clever game, to manipulate the information the supplier gets. So, we assume no such manipulation.
The third assumption is a sufficient condition to avoid the retailer's inferring useful information from the supplier's inventory level. With this assumption, the supplier's inventory level does not include information about future demands the retailer might use. Also, this assumption is a technical requirement to derive the optimal policy below.
For notational convenience, without loss of generality, we assume that
Modes of Decision Making
We consider four modes of decision making, dependent on two factors: whether the players' objectives are aligned or not, and whether their own demand forecasts are shared or not. Mode 1 is the centralized case, in which the players act to minimize the supply chain's total cost, and their own demand forecasts are shared. We call this the centralized model and its optimal policy the centralized solution. Mode 2 is a team-like cooperation case, in which the players have the common goal of minimizing the supply chain's total cost but do not share their own demand forecasts. We call this the team model.
Mode 3 is the competitive case with centralized demand forecasts, in which the objectives of the players are not aligned; i.e., they have their own local objectives, but they share their own demand forecasts. Finally, Mode 4 is the competitive case with decentralized demand forecasts, where the objectives of the players are not aligned, and neither are their own demand forecasts shared.
These four modes are summarized in Table 1 . We obtain the centralized and team solutions in §6. We derive a lower bound on the total supply chain cost and show that under certain conditions a myopic forecastcentered echelon base-stock policy is optimal. We obtain Nash equilibria for Modes 3 and 4 in §7. There, the players' policies are restricted to forecast-centered echelon basestock policies. We show that under certain conditions there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
Centralized Solutions and Team Solutions
Because the two-player model above can represent a oneplayer model as a special case, any results about the optimal policy for Mode 2 are directly applicable to Mode 1. Thus, in this section we focus on Mode 2, that is, we suppose that the players have the common goal of minimizing the supply chain's total cost, and they make their decisions based on the limited information they have. We derive a lower bound on the total expected per-period cost and then construct a simple policy that, under an additional assumption, achieves this bound. (The approach is similar to that of Chen and Zheng 1994 .) The policy uses a certain function of the state variables, called the forecastcentered echelon inventory position, for each player. In terms of these functions, the policy is a standard myopic base-stock policy. We begin by setting up a revised cost-accounting scheme, following Chen and Zheng (1994) . The total cost incurred at the end of period t is
Suppose instead we charge the following cost at the end of
This scheme just shifts costs across time periods, so it leaves the long-run average cost unchanged.
We develop a lower bound on the expectation of (1). Define
We can now state the lower bound.
Lemma 1. For the team model, under Assumption 1,
Next we derive one-dimensional functions that are equivalent to G 
Proposition 1. For the team model, under Assumption 1,
is a lower bound on the long-run average cost.
Next, we define the forecast-centered echelon inventory positions at stages 1 and 2 as
respectively. Then, define a policy as follows:
t IL 2 t otherwise and 
When Assumption 2 does not hold, the myopic policy need not be optimal. Assumption 2 assures that the forecast-centered echelon inventory position at each stage is less than or equal to the corresponding base-stock level at the beginning of every period. If Assumption 2 does not hold, this inequality might be reversed in some periods. However, as usual, if demands are rarely negative, the myopic policy is likely a good approximation.
Note that the above results for the team model (Mode 2) also hold for the centralized model (Mode 1), because Mode 1 is a special case of Mode 2. By incorporating all the players' own updates into the common updates and then resetting the players' own updates to zero, the team model reduces to the centralized one.
Echelon Inventory Game
This section explores the echelon inventory (EI) game, similar to that of Cachon and Zipkin (1999) . The players' strategies are specified by myopic forecast-centered echelon base-stock levels y i , i = 1 2, where y i ∈ = − . The players choose their strategies simultaneously. Having made their choices, the players implement their policies over an infinite horizon. All model parameters are common knowledge. In the previous section we showed that, under Assumptions 1 and 2, the myopic forecast-centered basestock policy is optimal. These two assumptions continue to hold here. Note that this implies that the forecast-centered inventory position after ordering at stage 2 is y 2 at the beginning of every period. As in the previous section, we focus on Mode 4. The results apply also to Mode 3.
Let H i y 1 y 2 denote the expected per-period cost of player i, i = 1 2, under the pair of forecast-centered echelon base-stock levels y 1 y 2 . The best reply mapping for player i is a set-valued relationship as follows:
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is a pair of forecastcentered echelon base-stock levels, y To specify H i y 1 y 2 , we define some functions. Definê G 1 IL 1 t − D t t as the retailer's cost charged at the end of period t, wherê
as the retailer's expected cost charged at the end of period t, when the common demand forecast vector in period t − L 1 is F 0 t − L 1 and the retailer's own forecast vector is F 1 t − L 1 , where
Let y a 1 be a minimum point ofĠ 1 z . Choosing suitably both y
even if there are multiple minimum points ofĠ 1 z .
The retailer's cost depends on both its own echelon base-stock level and the supplier's. After the players place their orders in period t − L 1 − L 2 , the supplier's echelon inventory position equals y 2 + F
After shipments arrive in period t − L 1 , but before demand occurs, the supplier's echelon inventory level
t − L 1 , the supplier can completely fill the retailer's order in period t − L 1 . On the other hand, when
t − L 1 , the supplier cannot fill the entire order, and
Next, we specify H 2 y 1 y 2 . First, defineĜ 2 IL 1 t − D t t as the supplier's cost charged at the end of period t, wherê
as the supplier's expected cost charged at the end of period t, when the common demand forecast vector in period t − L 1 is F 0 t − L 1 and the retailer's own forecast vector is
Also, definė
Also,
Therefore,
These functions H i y 1 y 2 extend those in Cachon and Zipkin (1999) to the case of decentralized demand forecasts.
Echelon Inventory Game Equilibria
We show that a Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. For this, we strengthen Assumption 2. We require that the supports of the forecast updates be bounded below, and consequently those of 1 and 2 are also bounded below. We further assume that any large demand is possible. is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Next, we consider two extreme cases. In the first, the retailer is charged all of the backorder cost; the supplier pays no shortage penalty cost. The other case is the opposite-the supplier pays the entire backorder cost. These results are consistent with those of Cachon and Zipkin (1999) . Here, the retailer has no incentive to hold inventory and in fact holds as little as possible.
Comparing the Equilibrium with the Team Solution
We next compare the Nash equilibrium of the EI game with the team solution. We show that the players' base-stock levels in the Nash equilibrium are less than those in the team solution. This is consistent with the result of Cachon and Zipkin (1999) for the independent-demand model. From Proposition 6, provided the backorder cost is shared, the team solution is not a Nash equilibrium of the EI game. Thus, the competitive setting reduces the efficiency of the supply chain. Both the retailer's and the supplier's strategies in equilibrium are less than the team solution. Competition reduces inventory levels.
Cooperative Policies
Because the team solution is not an equilibrium, we now explore a scheme to revise the players' incentives so as to enable each player to adopt the team solution with the confidence that the other player will, too. Suppose all parties agree to adopt a linear transfer-payment contract. The contract requires the supplier to transfer the following payment to the retailer,
where I i t is stage i's on-hand inventory, B 1 t is the retailer's backorders, and i and 1 are parameters. We do not restrict the signs of the parameters. When the sign is positive, the supplier transfers the payment to the retailer, and when the sign is negative, the supplier receives the payment from the retailer. For the system with independent demands Cachon and Zipkin (1999) developed a similar contract, namely,
where B 2 t is the supplier's backorders and 2 is a parameter. The difference between (5) and (6) lies in what exactly we measure at the supplier, on-hand inventory or backorders. Note that there is a simple relation between them: For any pair of forecast-centered base-stock levels y 1 y 2 ,
Thus, the transfer payments (5) and (6) are similar. (In particular, they are equivalent with respect to the second-order condition on y 1 and y 2 . Upon differentiating twice, the difference y 2 − y 1 disappears.) We find the set of contracts 1 2 1 such that the team solution is a Nash equilibrium. These allow for an arbitrary division of the system-wide cost. Consider the following contracts, parameterized by ∈ 0 1 :
For any sample path, the system-wide cost incurred in period t is h 1 + h 2 I 1 t + h 2 I 2 t + pB t . The retailer's cost with the transfer payment is
The supplier's cost with the transfer payment is
Because for any sample path, both players' costs with the transfer payment are proportional to the system-wide cost, so are their expected costs. Thus, the contract with parameters (7) coordinates the supply chain. Let H c i y 1 y 2 denote player i's expected per-period cost with the transfer payment. Also, let H y 1 y 2 denote the system-wide per-period cost; i.e., H y 1 y 2 = H 1 y 1 y 2 + H 2 y 1 y 2 .
Proposition 7. With the transfer payments (7) and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, H c 1 y 1 y 2 = H y 1 y 2 and H c 2 y 1 y 2 = 1 − H y 1 y 2 . From Proposition 7, given the transfer payments (7), both the supplier and the retailer act to minimize the systemwide per-period cost.
Here is the main result of this section. It says that, given the transfer payments (7), the team solution y * 1 y * 2 is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, this solution is the unique equilibrium under certain conditions. Let y + 2 denote the supplier's strategy such that where y 1 ∈ y
. At those equilibria the supplier holds no safety stock. The shipments the supplier receives are sent immediately to the retailer. So, the supplier acts merely as a transfer point between the outside source and the retailer. Of course, those equilibria can be team solutions under certain model parameters, but Proposition 8 says that even when they are not team solutions, they can still be equilibria. Thus, managers need to be careful in applying the transfer-payment scheme to avoid getting caught in an inferior equilibrium.
Benefits from Sharing Retailer's Demand Forecast Information
This section provides a partial analysis of the benefits of sharing information. Specifically, we show that if the retailer shares his information with the supplier, then the supplier's cost can only improve in both the team and competitive settings. (We have thus far been unable to obtain corresponding results for sharing the supplier's information. That matter is addressed later, in the numerical experiment.) We first show that in the competitive setting, the supplier's cost in the Nash equilibrium after sharing the retailer's own demand forecasts is less than or equal to the cost before sharing. Let H r 2 and r r 2 denote the supplier's cost function and best reply mapping after sharing. 2 . Because C * 1 does not change by sharing the retailer's own demand forecasts, from Proposition 10 the total cost in the team solution after sharing is less than or equal to the cost before sharing. Thus, because with the transfer payment the supplier's cost is proportional to the total cost in the team solution, it is also less than or equal to the cost before sharing.
Numerical Examples
With some numerical examples, we explore how several factors in the model affect the performance of the system and the incentives of each player to share information.
To make the picture clearer, we slightly alter the overall measures of cost. Specifically, we deduct the pipeline inventory cost h 2 L 1 from both the supplier's cost function and the system-wide cost function. This quantity is unaffected by the strategies chosen by the players. We denote the resulting cost byH .
We measure two types of performance penalties. First, we calculate the percentage increase of the cost in the competitive setting over the cost in the team solution. We call this the competition penalty, as in Cachon and Zipkin (1999) Here, we assume the players do not share their own demand forecasts. Second, we compute the percentage increase of the cost with decentralized demand forecasts over the cost with the centralized forecasts. We call this the forecast decentralization penalty. Note that, in the EI game, we can compare the Nash equilibrium before and after sharing the players' own information, by considering the shared information as the part of the common demand forecasts.
There are four cases to consider: (1) none of the players' own demand forecasts is shared, (2) only the retailer's own demand forecasts are shared, (3) only the supplier's own demand forecasts are shared, (4) both players' own demand forecasts are shared. To distinguish the cases we use indices "R," "S," and "B" to indicate the costs in cases 2, 3, and 4, respectively. For example, H B y 1 y 2 denotes the system-wide expected one-period cost for the competitive setting in case 4 ("B" means both forecasts are shared), and H cR 1 y 1 y 2 denotes the retailer's expected one-period cost for the cooperative setting in case 2 ("R" means only the retailer's forecasts are shared). Also, y aB 2 denotes the supplier's equilibrium strategy, when both players' own demand forecasts are shared.
Then, we consider three types of decentralization penalty. The first penalty is the cost difference between cases 1 and 4, the second penalty is the cost difference between cases 2 and 4, and the third penalty is the cost difference between cases 3 and 4. We call these penalty (B), penalty (S), and penalty (R), respectively. For example, the systemwide penalty (B) for the competitive setting is While the competition penalty is always nonnegative, the forecast decentralization penalty may be negative. A negative penalty means that sharing demand forecasts increases the cost.
Throughout the numerical examples in this subsection, we fix p = 5, h 1 = 0 5, and h 2 = 0 5 and suppose that the forecast updates follow the normal distribution. The standard deviations of all forecast updates are 1. Also, the covariance structure for the common shared forecast updates is Cov e 0 t t + i e 0 t t + j = 
where is a parameter such that −1 < < 1. Thus, the correlation of the updates over time periods exponentially decreases.
Competition Penalty over Model Parameters. We now examine how the competition penalty changes over the model parameters, M 1 and M 2 . We initially set M 1 = M 2 = M 0 = L 1 = L 2 = 4 and = 0. Then, we change each of M 1 and M 2 keeping other parameters fixed. Tables 2 to 3 show the resulting competition penalties. We can see that the competition penalty is relatively small when the allocation of the backorder penalty cost is nearly equal. It increases as the allocation of the backorder cost becomes asymmetric. These findings are consistent with those of Cachon and Zipkin (1999) . We also have tried other values of M 0 , L 1 , L 2 , and . The results are not reported here. In those cases, has a similar impact on the competition penalties. Furthermore, similar impacts appear when forecasts are shared.
Next we examine the effect of sharing demand forecasts on performance. In the competitive setting, each player aims to minimize his own cost. Thus, when he obtains information from the other player, the change in his strategy may hurt the other player. Hence, it is not at all clear that anyone benefits by sharing his own demand forecast. The competition penalty over Table 3 . Forecast Decentralization Penalty over Model Parameters. We first examine how the decentralization penalty changes over the model parameters M 1 , M 2 , and M 0 . As above, we initially set Tables 4 to 12 show the results. The forecast decentralization penalty is positive in most instances, though it is negative in some. Negative penalties seem more likely for the supplier than the total system or the retailer. On the other hand, the team penalty is always positive.
Also, penalty (S) has different features from penalty (R). In the numerical examples penalty (R) is positive. We discuss this later in detail. Table 4 .
The forecast decentralization penalty (B) over Table 5 . Table 7 . Table 9 . In a single-stage model with normal demand, the cost function and the optimal cost are both proportional to the standard deviation. In this spirit, we conducted linear regres- When the retailer's own forecast information is shared, it becomes part of the common forecast. Here, s 1 does not change, and s 2 decreases. Thus, we expect both players' costs to decrease.
On the other hand, when the supplier's forecast information is shared, s 1 decreases but s 2 increases. The supplier faces more uncertainty in the retailer's ordering decisions. The logic is rather subtle. The retailer uses the forecast- Table 10 .
The forecast decentralization penalty (B) over M 0 L 1 = L 2 = M 1 = M 2 = 4 = 0 . From Proposition 11 we see that the cost in the team solution with 1 and 2 is z times of that with 1 and 2 . Similarly, the retailer's and the supplier's costs with 1 and 2 in the Nash equilibrium in the competitive setting are also z times those with 1 and 2 . Thus, since the competition and the forecast decentralization penalties measure ratios of costs, the values of those penalties are the same.
Also, as the players' forecast update horizons or the lead times get longer, the resulting lead time demands have larger variances. Thus, we cannot explicitly distinguish the effects of variance increases in the lead time demands and asymmetries of the players in the numerical examples. However, from Proposition 11, if we change the standard deviations of 1 and 2 with the same ratio, the competition and the forecast decentralization penalties do not change. Thus, the effects observed in the numerical examples seem more likely to come from the asymmetries, for example, from the differences between the forecast update horizons M 1 and M 2 .
Conclusions
We studied the benefits from sharing demand forecasts in a supply chain, in which both the supplier and the retailer have their own demand forecast information, in both competitive and cooperative settings. In the competitive setting, the team solution is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium in the EI game, so competition hurts the supply chain's performance. In most of the numerical examples, when = 0 7 ( is the retailer's ratio of the backorder penalty-cost allocation), the competition penalty becomes smallest over five cases of , and it gets larger as the allocation of the backorder cost becomes more asymmetric. These findings are consistent with Cachon and Zipkin's (1999) for the model with independent demands.
Competition makes the effects of sharing demand forecasts in a supply chain hard to predict. We might expect that the benefit from sharing forecasts increases as the part of the players' demand forecasts in the uncertainty of lead time demands increases. However, the numerical examples do not always support this notion. They are consistent with it in cooperative settings, but not in competitive settings. Furthermore, the benefit from sharing forecasts is sometimes negative in the competitive setting, whereas it is positive for all instances in the cooperative setting. When the supplier shares his forecasts, he faces more uncertainty, because the retailer's ordering decisions become more volatile than without sharing. This is a negative feature of sharing the supplier's forecasts. While this negative feature might be offset by the gain of the retailer in the cooperative setting, it may not in the competitive setting. The benefits of sharing forecasts in the competitive setting vary considerably with . For some instances, the supplier's forecast decentralization penalty ranges from −2 to 31. Also, the two players' benefits from sharing information can be quite different. These observations suggest caution-the effects of sharing demand forecasts depend strongly on both the competitive setting and the specific model parameters.
Electronic Companion
An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of the online version that can be found at http://or.journal .informs.org/.
Appendix
The random variablesẽ
and
